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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plainti If-Respondent, 
-vs-
LEWIS ELMER FRAYER, alias 
~VILLIAM CLIFFORD LYNN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10175 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant Lewis Elmer Frayer, alias William Clif-
ford Lynn, appeals from his conviction of the crime of 
second-degree murder in the District Court of Davis 
County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant Lewis Elmer Frayer was charged with 
the crime of first-degree murder. Jury trial was had in the 
District Court of the Second Judicial District, Davis 
County, State of Utah, and the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty of murder in the second degree. The appellant was 
committed to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate 
term as provided by law. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent State of Utah submits that the appel-
lant's conviction should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of facts. 
The appellant Lewis Elmer Frayer, alias William Clif-
ford Lynn, was charged with the crime of first-degree mur-
der in that it was alleged that he murdered Louis Sylva 
Garcia on or about the 7th day of July, 1963, at Centerville, 
Utah. 
Richard Engstrom, a student at the University of Utah, 
met the appellant at the Streamliner Lounge on Redwood 
Road in Salt Lake City, Utah, on Sunday, July 7, 1963 
(Tr. 57). The appellant requested Engstrom to give him 
a ride to Salty's Lounge (Tr. 58). As the two were riding 
in Engstrom's car, the appellant indicated that he wanted 
to smoke but said that he had no matches. Engstrom told 
him there were some in the glove compartment. Where-
upon appellant opened the glove compartment in Eng-
strom's car and found a .22 caliber Rueger semi-automatic 
pistol (Tr. 58-59). The appellant stated that he knew of 
a dance that was supposedly taking place in Evanston, 
Wyoming, and suggested that he and Engstrom go there 
(Tr. 60, 519). The appellant and Engstrom then went to 
Salty's Tavern and purchased some beer (Tr. 6). The ap-
pellant, when they stopped at Salty's Tavern, grabbed the 
ignition keys to Engstrom's car and kept them in his posses-
sion throughout the evening except when it was necessary 
to give them to Engstrom to operate the vehicle (Tr. 60). 
The pair proceeded to Evanston, Wyoming, and on the 
way stopped at the Skyline Cafe in Summit County, Utah, 
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for gasoline. The pumps were closed and they went inside 
the cafe (Tr. 61-62). Two waitresses who were in the cafe 
told the appellant that the pumps to the gas station were 
locked and that the attendant was not around. The appel-
lant indicated that he would shoot the locks off the tanks 
(Tr. 62, 95). The waitresses advised him that he could ob-
tain gas at Kimball's Junction and he then left in the com-
pany of Engstrom ( Tr. 62) . 
In the area of the Wanship Dam, the appellant asked 
Engstrom to pull over to the side of the road and then asked 
Engstrom to perform a homosexual act with him and Eng-
strom refused (Tr. 62). When the pair reached Coalville, 
the appellant became ill and vomited. However, they con-
tinued into Evanston ( Tr. 63) . 
The appellant advised Engstrom that he had killed two 
people before and had not been caught (Tr. 63). 
In Evanston, the pair could not find the dance and after 
looking unsuccessfully for a house of prostitution, they 
started back toward Salt Lake City (Tr. 63). They again 
stopped at a cafe where the appellant purchased some fire 
crackers. He bought one pack and stole three (Tr. 64). 
Thereafter, they proceeded down the road and then 
stopped at the side of the road. The appellant jumped out, 
grabbed the keys to the car and pulled Engstrom's pistol 
from behind his back and started firing some shots into the 
side of a mountain (Tr. 64). The gun jammed but the 
appellant was able to unjam the gun and place another shell 
into the chamber. He then fired some shots close to Eng-
strom, towards the ground (Tr. 65). He then turned the 
gun towards Engstrom's stomach and pulled the trigger 
(Tr. 66). Engstrom asked the appellant why he wanted 
to kill him and the appellant said that he did not want to 
kill him because the latter was his friend (Tr. 66). They 
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got back into the car and started toward Salt Lake City. 
The appellant still had the gun in his possession (Tr. 67). 
Engstrom told appellant to put the gun back in the glove 
compartment. The appellant opened the glove box and 
asked Engstrom if there were more shells. Appellant ob-
served additional bullets in the glove box, including .22 
caliber shorts. The appellant grabbed the box of shells and 
Engstrom told him they would not work in the gun. Eng-
strom said that the gun had to be cocked each time a .22 
short was fired and it would not work automatically. There-
after, he heard the glove-box door slam and assumed that 
the appellant had replaced the gun. Engstrom grabbed 
some of the shells from the appellant and threw them away 
(Tr. 68). Engstrom was certain the appellant did not give 
him all the shells taken from the glove box. 
On the way between Ogden and Farmington, near Hill 
Air Force Base, the appellant observed a blue Ford Falcon 
at the side of the road with a middle-aged woman asleep 
inside. The appellant said that this was his aunt and that she 
had probably stalled. He asked Engstrom to make aU-turn 
to find her. They parked side by side with the Falcon auto-
mobile and the appellant indicated that it was not his aunt's 
car (Tr. 71). Thereafter, they started back toward Salt 
Lake City and as they neared a radio station, past Lagoon, 
the appellant observed a 1958 orchid-colored Oldsmobile. 
Appellant told Engstrom that this car was his uncle's and 
that his uncle would take him home (Tr. 72). Engstrom 
noticed the car had Missouri license plates and advised the 
appellant. The appellant said it was still his uncle's car and 
that his uncle "traveled a lot." Engstrom did not believe 
him but was happy to get rid of him. Engstrom let the 
appellant out at the car and drove home. When he got 
home, there was no gun (Tr. 72-73). 
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The 1958 Oldsmobile was owned by Barbara Haarman. 
~ r rs. Haarman was a twenty-two year old divorcee and was 
in the company of Louis Garcia and Rocky Bierschwal (Tr. 
25). They had arrived in Ogden from Idaho on July 5th. 
Garcia and Bierschwal were musicians. Garcia was able to 
obtain employment from the Flare Club in Ogden on the 
nights of July 5th and 6th (Tr. 26-28). On the night of the 
6th of July, or the morning of the 7th, Garcia, Mrs. Haar-
man and Bierschwal started toward Salt Lake. They pur-
chased some baloney sandwiches and finally stopped by the 
side of the road near Parish Lane in Davis County because 
they were sleepy. 
The next thing Mrs. Haarman recalled, he awoke and 
saw the appellant holding a gun (Tr. 28). Bierschwal was 
cleaning out part of the back seat. The appellant then put 
his hand up Mrs. Haarman's dress, at which time she called 
for assistance from Mr. Bierschwal (Tr. 29). Bierschwal 
then grabbed the appellant and hit him with a stick and 
told him to get going. Appellant said that he wanted his 
gun back. In the meantime, Mrs. Haarman shook Garcia 
but could not awaken him (Tr. 30). The appellant came 
back with a board and demanded his gun and said he would 
hit Bierschwal with the board if he didn't give him back his 
gun. Bierschwal then checked the gun to see if it was empty 
and then returned it to the appellant. The appellant stated 
that the only thing he wanted was a ride to Salt Lake. 
Bierschwal testified that the first time he saw the appel-
lant, the appellant was in the car with a pistol in his hand 
(Tr. 46-4 7). Bierschwal said that the appellant said that 
the gun was not real and that appellant indicated that he 
just "·anted to sleep and get a ride to Salt Lake City. 
Bierschwal said that he had then fixed a place for him in 
the back seat. \Vhen he started to arrange a place for the 
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appellant, he heard Mrs. Haarman call out and observed 
the appellant trying to get on top of her (Tr. 48-49). There-
after, the incident of Bierschwal striking the appellant with 
the stick and the appellant coming back to get his gun 
occurred. Bierschwal told the appellant he would give him 
a ride into Salt Lake City after he calmed down (Tr. 51). 
According to Bierschwal, the appellant appeared intoxi-
cated or high when he first saw him (Tr. 55). At this time, 
it was noticed that Garcia had a spot of blood on his face, 
apparently coming from his nose (Tr. 31-32, 53). They 
started to drive into Salt Lake and stopped at a filling sta-
tion where they moistened a rag and wiped Garcia's nose 
and head (Tr. 53, 88). Thereafter, they drove to St. Mark's 
Hospital and Bierschwal went into the hospital to obtain 
a doctor (Tr. 54). When he returned, the appellant was 
gone and Mrs. Haarman said that the appellant had stated 
that he had to find a restroom and left (Tr. 34). 
Garcia died at approximately 5:00a.m. at the St. Mark's 
Hospital from a .22 caliber bullet wound in the head (Tr. 
54, 130-131). 
· · Engstrom read about the killing in the newspaper the 
next day, advised his parents, and the police were called 
(Tr. 76-77). . 
Officer Wade Robinson testified that he made a latent 
fingerprint search of the 1958 Oldsmobile and removed 
several prints from the automobile (Tr. 96-99). He identi-
fied some of these prints as belonging to the appellant (Tr. 
106). 
The Davis County Sheriff's office sent deputy sheriffs to 
Salty's Tavern, based upon Engstrom's assistance, and there 
obtained an identification from the bartender that appel-
lant frequented the bar. On July 9th, appellant was ap-
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proached at Salty's Bar. He gave the officers the name of 
Clifford Lynn. He was then taken and placed in a lineup 
where he was identified by both Mrs. Haarman and Rocky 
Bicrschwal (Tr. 117-122). Thereafter, the appellant was 
taken to Davis County where he was questioned. He gave 
a false alibi that he had been various places (Tr. 124-126, 
545-546). At all times before the appellant was questioned, 
he was thoroughly advised of his rights and given full op-
portunity to contact an attorney (Tr. 192, 193). 
On July lOth, the appellant requested permission to talk 
to the Davis County Sheriff. After being thoroughly advised 
of his rights (Tr. 196,202), the appellant advised the Sheriff 
that he wanted to get the matter off his chest. He had pre-
viously asked someone at Salty's Bar to get an attorney for 
him (Tr. 207). He first advised the Sheriff that he had not 
committed the shooting (Tr. 209). The Sheriff told him 
that telling the truth would help and the appellant told 
the Sheriff that he shot Garcia accidently while trying to 
"rifle" the car for pills (Tr. 234). Thereafter, a verbatim 
written statement was taken from the appellant (Ex. M) in 
which the appellant admitted shooting Garcia but said that 
it was accidental during the burglary of the automobile. 
While the appellant was being kept in pretrial confine-
ment, he made an admission to other prisoners that he had 
"killed a man and I am not even shedding a tear." (Tr. 
583, 587). Further, he indicated that he did not like Mexi-
cans (Tr. 587). At trial, the appellant denied that he shot 
Louis Garcia. 
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a ver-
dict of guilty of murder in the second degree. Additional 
facts necessary to the determination of the points raised on 
appeal will be set forth in the argument portion of this brief. 
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THE PROSECUTION DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN EXAMINING THE APPELLANT CONCERNING 
FELONIES HE COMMITTED AS A JUVENILE. 
The appellant contends prejudicial error occurred dur-
ing his trial when the prosecutor on cross-examination in-
quired into felonies the appellant had committed as a juve-
nile. The record discloses the following occurred (Tr. 571-
573): 
"MR. NEWEY: If it please your Honor, before 
going further into the State's rebuttal, I ask leave of 
the Court to call the defendant back for further exam-
ination. 
MR. HANSEN: We have no objection. 
LEWIS ELMER FRAYER 
the defendant herein, returned to the witness stand 
and testified further as follows : 
CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continuing) 
BY MR. NEWEY: 
Q Lewis Frayer, you are the same person that was 
called and testified. You realize you are still under 
oath? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You have testified on direct-examination as to 
your reputation for working, and not having been 
before the authorities, no trouble or problems; is that 
right? 
A No, sir. Mr. Hansen asked me if I was ever in 
prison. 
Q Let me ask you this: Have you been before the 
juvenile authorities for things that would be tanta-
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mount to felonies, if you weren't a juvenile- be the 
same as felonies? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And how many times have you been before the 
J uvcnile Court for serious offenses that would be the 
same as felonies if you had been an adult? 
A About three, four, something like that. 
Q Did one involve burglary, and setting fires? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Another involve unlawful entry and damage to 
property? 
A I believe so. 
Q Another one involve theft of some money from 
a church in Murray? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. NEWEY: I believe that's all. 
MR. HANSEN: You may step down, Louie. 
(Witness excused.) 
MR. HANSEN: Now, at this time, your Honor, 
before the State goes forward with rebuttal, we move 
for permission to recall Rocky, to go into his past 
record, on the same grounds and for the very same 
reasons that Mr. Newey asked the defendant." 
No objection was made at any time to the appellant's 
cross-examination by the State. Only after the State op-
posed the recall of Rocky Bierschwal did the appellant 
move for a mistrial (Tr. 575). The trial court denied the 
motion for mistrial, noting (Tr. 580) : 
"THE COURT: The court is of the opinion that 
the defendant opened the question on direct-exam-
ination. Furthermore, there was no objection made 
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to the cross-examination when the defendant was re-
called. The motion for a mistrial is denied." 
It is submitted that appellant failed to act seasonably to 
prohibit the alleged improper cross-examination and, there-
fore, cannot complain. It is well settled that an objection 
must be made at the time the allegedly prejudicial occur-
rence takes place or error cannot be claimed on appeal. In 
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice (4th ed.), Section 350 
notes: 
"The proper time to object to the introduction of 
evidence is when it becomes apparent that error will 
be committed by receiving evidence which is not ad-
missible, as when the evidence is offered or when a 
question is asked which is in itself improper or calls 
for an improper answer. 
"An objection to a question comes too late after the 
question has been answer [sic J." 
In Section 351, it is also noted: 
"Any objection to the admissibility of evidence is 
waived by failure to object thereto. If defendant fails 
to object to evidence when first offered, he waives its 
incompetency. Objection cannot be raised when it is 
later offered, unless its inadmissibility is not then ap-
parent." 
A party may not allow incompetent evidence to be received 
and then move for a mistrial unless there was no oppor-
tunity to make a timely objection. Abbott, supra, Section 
352 notes: 
"A party who has allowed obviously incompetent 
evidence to be received without objection is not en-
titled to have it stricken out, .... " 
It is further noted in the same work at Section 353: 
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"The failure to object to a question before answer, 
if the grounds of objection were then apparent, pre-
cludes a subsequent motion to strike out the answer. 
"If there is no opportunity to object before the ques-
tion is answered, or if the inadmissible character of 
the evidence is first apparent from the answer, or sub-
sequently a motion to strike should be made immedi-
ately upon its objectionable character becoming ap-
parent. However, it is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court to entertain the motion at any time 
subsequent to the admission of the evidence, even 
where no objection was seasonably made." 
In accord with the above observations is Wharton, Criminal 
Law and Procedure (Anderson ed. 195 7), Sections 2044-
2047. 
In State v. Tuttle, 16 U.2d 288, 399 P.2d 500 ( 1965), 
this Court noted that a defendant should impose a timely 
objection to any improper evidence or be foreclosed from 
complaining. The Court observed: 
"A further difficulty with the defendant's position 
is that there was no timely objection made to the evi-
dence in question." 
In People v. Wong Toy, 189 Cal. 587, 209 Pac. 543 
( 1922), the California Supreme Court noted that an ob-
jection after a question is answered comes too late and 
cannot be the basis for error on appeal. 
In State v. Gish, 87 Idaho 341, 393 P.2d 342 ( 1964), 
the appellant was charged with homicide. The prosecution 
introduced rebuttal evidence that was improper. The court 
observed: 
"In the instant case, no objection was made at the 
time the testimony of the witness was introduced and 
not until the jury had heard it in its entirety. We do 
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not consider this to have been a timely objection. State 
v. Spencer, supra; Schmidt v. Williams, supra. 
In People v. Smith, 43 Cal. 2d 110, 110 P.2d 472 ( 1941), 
the appellant on cross-examination in a grand theft prose-
cution was asked questions relative to his past livelihood 
and the origin of his money. The appellate court held that 
since no objection was voiced until after the evidence was 
offered, no error could be claimed. The court observed: 
"Appellant assigns as error the rulings of the court 
in requiring the defendant to answer certain questions 
asked him on cross-examination relative to his past 
livelihood and the origin of his monies. But as the 
questions relative to the origin of his monies were 
answered before the objection, it must be disregarded." 
In State v. Homolka, 158 Kan. 22, 145 P.2d 156 ( 1944), 
the Kansas Supreme Court refused to reverse a conviction 
where the appellant was examined as to his juvenile court 
record and observed: 
"First, that the witness had already testified, with-
out objection from appellant, that he had been a ward 
of the juvenile court; and second, because we cannot 
say that admission of the record so prejudiced appel-
lant's rights as to require reversal. Two brothers of 
Calvin testified substantially as he did. The state 
offered no evidence to impeach their credibility. It 
may also be noted that appellant, for the purpose of 
impeaching the credibility of the state's principal wit-
ness, showed that he too had been a ward of the juve-
nile court .... " 
The reason for the timely objection rule was stated in 
People v. Wallace, 89 Cal. 158, 26 Pac. 650 ( 1891): 
" ... The rule is one of practice, and is applied in order 
to save the time of the court, which otherwise would 
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be uselessly consumed in listening to testimony, and 
then striking it out; and also to prevent a party from 
obtaining an advantage by deliberately consenting that 
a witness may give evidence upon a certain point with 
the expectation or belief that it may be favorable to 
him, and then having it excluded when the evidence 
is not satisfactory." 
In this case, there was ample opportunity for the appel-
lant to raise objection. None was raised, nor did a motion 
for mistrial come immediately on the heels of the allegedly 
improper evidence. Appellant's counsel, instead of moving 
immediately for relief, sought to recall a prosecution wit-
ness to elicit the same information. It would unduly prolong 
this brief to cite the numerous and legion of cases that sup-
port the rule that appellant cannot complain under such 
circumstances. Further, there was no prolonged examina-
tion nor did the prosecution argue the matter to the jury. 
The issue has not been preserved and is not properly before 
the court. 
Secondly, it is submitted that the examination was not 
improper. It is acknowledged that under varying circum-
stances and statutes, courts have found it improper to in-
quire into juvenile convictions. People v. Gomer, 152 Cal. 
2d 139, 313 P.2d 58 ( 1957); Burge v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 
32, 255 S.W. 754 ( 1923); Thomas v. United States, 121 
F.2d 905 (D.C. App. 1941) ; Annot., 14 7 A.L.R. 443. How-
ever, the particular construction and limitations placed on 
the rule have been given varying treatment by the courts. 
Annot., 14 7 A.L.R. 443. 
The provision of statutory law possibly applicable at the 
time of the appellant's trial was Laws of Utah, 1931, ch. 
29, § 32, which provided: 
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"No adjudication upon the status of any child by 
the juvenile court shall operate to impose any of the 
civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by a conviction in 
a criminal case, nor shall any child be deemed a crim-
inal by reason of such adjudication, nor shall such 
adjudication be deemed a conviction. Neither the 
record of the disposition of a child nor any evidence 
given in the juvenile court shall be admissible as evi-
dence against the child in any case or proceedings in 
any other court." 
Section 55-10-105(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pres-
ently provides: 
"Neither the record in the juvenile court nor any 
evidence given in the juvenile court shall be admissible 
as evidence against the child in any proceedings in any 
other court, with the exception of cases involving 
traffic violations." 
Thus, what the Utah law prohibits is the introduction of 
( 1) the record of disposition or the record in the juvenile 
court, or ( 2) evidence given in the juvenile court. Neither 
the records of the juvenile court nor evidence presented 
before it were introduced in the instant case. Consequently, 
there was no violation of the Utah statutory provisions for 
protection of juveniles.1 Further, the Utah statutory law 
has never been as restrictive as those prohibiting disclosure 
of the "fact" of conviction or presence in juvenile court. 
See Anno. 14 7 A.L.R. 449; State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 
120 P.2d 798 ( 1942). Therefore, it would seem unobjec-
tionable to inquire as to the actual commission of felonies 
1 The Utah provision as it now reads is based in part on the National Coun-
cil on Crime and Delinquency's Standard Juvenile Court Act, 1959. Although 
that act does not contain an exact provision like that currently in Section 55-
10-105, U.C.A., 1953, the model act, comment 25, does not indicate that it 
was intended from provisions like that in the Utah statute that juvenile mis-
conduct could not be the basis for impeachment. 
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at the time an individual was a juvenile if the time is rele-
vant to the matter in controversy. Especially should this be 
so where, as here, the time of juvenile misconduct was rele-
vant to the veracity of the defendant because the defendant 
was 19 years old at the time of trial, and the defendant ad-
mitted commission of acts which would be felonious. This 
is in accord with the general rule allowing examination of a 
\Vitness or an accused into acts of misconduct which would 
directly affect veracity. State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 
64 P.2d 229 ( 1936) ; Wigmore on Evidence ( 3rd ed.) §§ 
981, 982; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 882. 
An excellent and clear statement of the rule appears in 
.i\.lilitary justice Evidence, Department of the Army Pam-
phlet27-172 (1962),atpage420: 2 
"Any witness, including the accused, may be im-
peached by showing that he has committed an act of 
misconduct such as to affect his credibility. However, 
in those instances where the adverse party lacks com-
petent evidence of conviction for such an act, the show-
ing is limited to adducing the matter on cross-exam-
ination of the witness and independent evidence of the 
offense is not admissible, even though the witness de-
nies committing the act. Whether or not the act affects 
credibility is to be tested by the same standards as 
apply in the case of prior convictions. As in the case 
of prior convictions, evidence of prior acts of miscon-
duct of the accused may not be used, directly or in-
directly, to support an inference of guilt." 
In 1\f cCormick on Evidence, at page 87, it is stated: 
"The English common law tradition of 'cross-exam-
ination to credit,' permits the counsel to inquire into 
::Military courts, acting under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, follow 
the rules of evidence applicable in federal courts. United States v. Slozes 
1 U.S.C.M.A. 47, 1 C.M.R. 47 ( 1951); United States v. Dupree, 1 U.S.C.M.A: 
665,5 C.M.R. 93 ( 1952): 10 U.S.C. § 936. 
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the associations and personal history of the witness, 
including any particular misconduct which would tend 
to discredit his character, though not the subject of 
conviction for crime." 
See State v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 ( 1950); 
State v. Neal, 222 N.C. 546, 23 S.E.2d 911 ( 1943). 
Consequently, no error can be claimed. 
Additionally, it is submitted that evidence of the appel-
lant's juvenile action was proper to rebut the inferences 
raised by the appellant in opening argument and direct 
examination. 
On opening argument, the appelant's past history was 
brought up. Counsel stated that since the appellant was 
charged with first degre murder "we are going to bring in a 
lot of evidence about [the appellant]." (Tr. 300). Further, 
the opening argument presented a picture of a boy from a 
broken home, being shuttled from place to place and school 
to school, indicating merely that the appellant was the 
unfortunate victim of circumstances who had himself never 
been in trouble. 
When the appellant took the stand, he was questioned 
thoroughly concerning his past history of living with his 
natural parents, their separation, and his life with each 
parent and step-parent (Tr. 512-516). He was asked by 
his counsel if he had ever been convicted of a felony or 
served time in prison ( Tr. 516) . This itself was an injection 
of good character into the trial and gave the prosecution 
the right to rebut the inference. The defense having intro-
duced evidence of good character, the prosecution could 
rebut it. Wigmore, Evidence, §58, notes: 
"After a defendant has attempted to show his good 
character in his own aid, prosecution may in rebuttal 
offer as evidence his bad character. The true reason 
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for this srcms to be, not any relaxation of the principle 
just mentioned, i.e. not a permission to show the de-
fendant's bad character, but a liberty to refute his 
claim that he has a good one. Otherwise a defendant, 
secure from refutation, would have too clear a license 
unscrupulously to impose a false character upon the 
tribunal." 
The whole inference left with the jury after the appellant's 
direct testimony was that he had at best led an irregular life 
but had not violated the law. 
Virtually the same issue was involved in State v. Marin-
ski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E.2d 387 ( 1942), except not as 
exaggerated as in this case where appellant directly intro-
duced evidence of his good character. In M arinski, the 
defendant made a narration of how he had spent his previ-
ous life and the schools he had attended. He did not men-
tion his juvenile difficulties and commitment to the state 
industrial school. On cross-examination, the prosecution 
was allowed to go into the defendant's juvenile involve-
ments. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. It observed, as 
against a claim similar to that now urged: 
"That this is a salutary statute properly designed to 
afford some measure of protection from the indiscre-
tions of youth is beyond cavil. However, it is a vastly 
different matter to permit an interpretation that would 
enable a defendant to employ the statute for the pur-
pose of deception and to accomplish a miscarriage of 
justice. After all, a trial before a judicial tribunal is 
primarily a truth-determining process, and if it in any 
sense loses its character as such, it becomes the veriest 
sort of a mockery. It must be remembered that it was 
this defendant himself who not only offered to tell but 
insisted upon narrating the story of his previous years. 
To place himself in a favorable light before the court 
and jury it was necessary for him to tell but part of 
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his history and conceal the remainder. This he did. 
When this challenge confronted the court and the 
prosecuting attorney, did this statute render them im-
potent in their duty to reveal the truth? The partici-
pating members of this court are unanimously of the 
opinion that it did not. The cross-examination was 
proper." 
In United States v. Cary, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 348, 351, 26 
C.M.R. 128, 131 ( 1958), Chief Judge Quinn of the United 
States Court of Military Appeals observed: 
"In United States v Roark, 8 USCMA 279, 24 
CMR 89, we held that juvenile proceedings could not 
be used as evidence against an accused. Of course this 
does not mean that an accused can pervert the public 
policy that underlies the rule to protect himself against 
contradiction of his testimonial untruths." 
Since appellant injected only a part truth into the trial 
and expressly opened up his character, the prosecution was 
well within bounds to cross-examine the appellant as to his 
juvenile misdeeds. 
Finally, it is submitted that such an examination was not 
prejudicial. Section 77--42-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides: 
"After hearing an appeal the court must give judg-
ment without regard to errors or defects which do not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. If error has 
been committed, it shall not be presumed to have re-
sulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied that it 
has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the 
judgment." 
Certainly, it cannot be said that this one minor incident 
in a long trial, where the facts indicated bizarre and ques-
tionable moral conduct of the appellant, resulted in preju-
dice. First, the appellant's conduct during the ride to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
Evanston, Wyoming, with Engstrom, including the incident 
with the gun, his boasting about having killed previously, 
his solicitation of a homosexual act, his threat to shoot off 
the gas pump nozzles. In addition appellant's use of an 
alias and false statements to the police, along with the com-
pelling evidence of the appellant's guilt, all militate against 
any claim of prejudicial error. State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 
277Pac.972 (1929). 
InState v. Homolka, 158 Kan. 22, 145 P.2d 156 (1944), 
the Kansas Supreme Court in a similar case ruled that any 
error that may have been committed in putting in a juvenile 
court record did not prejudice the accused. 
In People v. Maloney, 92 Cal. App. 371, 268 Pac. 472 
( 1928), the appellant claimed error on the basis of the trial 
court's allowing evidence of a juvenile court conviction and 
commitment to a school. The court held no prejudice re-
sulted that would warrant reversal. 
In People v. Goodwin, 105 Cal. App. 122, 286 Pac. 1087 
( 1930), the court again ruled no prejudicial error could be 
claimed because of inquiry into juvenile offenses. It ob-
served, following the Maloney case : 
"In view of this decision we hold that the question 
and answer was not prejudicial to the defendant. The 
rule announced in the foregoing case gains added force 
here, since it appears from the transcript that the evi-
dence of appellant's guilt was conclusive and per-
mitted no doubt of the correctness of the verdict." 
Certainly, the evidence in this case presents no basis upon 
which it could be claimed the appellant was prejudiced. 
Too many other factors of this case demonstrated the 
appellant's character and guilt to say that the minor inci-
dent of the juvenile record prejudiced the jury. 
l\ o basis for reversal on this point can be claimed. 
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM AS A BASIS FOR RE-
VERSAL THAT THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
INSTRUCTED ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER BECAUSE 
THE EVIDENCE WAS FIRST DEGREE MURDER OR NOTH-
ING. 
· The appellant contends that the trial court erred in in-
structing on second degree murder and that, consequently, 
reversal is in order. The appellant's position is that the State 
tried the case on the theory of the felony murder rule and 
that all the evidence offered against the accused showed 
that the crime occurred during the time the appellant was 
burglarizing the automobile of Betty Haarman while look-
ing for pills. Thus, the appellant contends that the crime 
was committed under the State's theory during the course 
of a burglary which would support a conviction of first 
degree murder. 
It is submitted that there is no merit to the appellant's 
position since the instruction on second degree murder 
would be more beneficial to the accused than he deserved, 
even assuming the appellant's position to be correct and, 
therefore, no prejudice could have resulted. 
It seems to be the well settled rule that an accused can-
not be prejudiced by an instruction on a lesser offense than 
first degree murder where the evidence would only support 
a conviction of first degree murder. In 26 Am. Jur., Homi-
cide,§ 563, it is stated: 
"While there is some conflict on the question, the 
rule supported by the weight of authority seems to be 
that if the evidence demands or warrants a conviction 
of a higher degree of homicide than that found by the 
verdict, and there is either no evidence in support of 
acquittal or, if there is, it is not sufficient to warrant 
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or require acquittal, or is disbelieved by the jury, the 
defendant is not entitled to a reversal or a new trial on 
the ground that the court instructed on the lower 
degree of homicide, as to which there was no evidence, 
the theory being that he is not prejudiced thereby and 
cannot complain. 
"Under statutes to the effect that a jury may find 
a defendant guilty of a lower degree of the crime 
charged in the indictment than that of which the evi-
dence shows him to be guilty, and that a judgment 
based on such a finding is not illegal for lack of sup-
porting evidence, it has been held in some jurisdictions 
that the giving of an instruction on second degree 
murder is not an error warranting a new trial for 
one convicted of murder in that degree, on evidence 
showing him to be guilty of murder in the first degree 
or nothing." 
In 21 A.L.R. 622, it is stated: 
"Though the rights of a defendant who has been 
convicted of a lower degree of homicide than was 
warranted by the evidence are not definitely settled 
by the decisions, the rule in most jurisdictions appears 
to be that if the evidence demands a conviction of a 
higher degree of homicide, and does not warrant an 
acquittal, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial 
on the ground that, under an instruction so permitting, 
the jury found him guilty of a lower degree." 
This seems to be the weight in the great majority of juris-
dictions. See also Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1097-1100. Thus, in 
Baker v. State, 154 Georgia 716, 115 S.E. 119, 122, it was 
stated: 
"The justices are unanimously of the opinion that 
the law of voluntary manslaughter was not involved 
under the facts of the case, and that, where voluntary 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
manslaughter is not involved under the proof, an in-
struction thereon should not be given. They further 
agree, in accordance with a long line of decisions, 
that where the defendant was not convicted of volun-
tary manslaughter, and under the evidence voluntary 
manslaughter was not involved, any errors committed 
by the court in charging upon that subject are not 
cause for the grant of a new trial. The charge, how-
ever, was not erroneous as against the defendant, but 
was favorable to him." 
In 102 A.L.R. 1026, the same rule is noted with eighteen 
states supporting the proposition. It is there stated: 
"While there is some conflict on the question, the 
rule supported by the weight of authority seems to be 
that if the evidence demands or warrants a conviction 
of a higher degree of homicide than that found by 
the verdict, and there is either no evidence in support 
of acquittal, or, if there is, it is not sufficient to war-
rant or require acquittal, or is disbelieved by the jury, 
the defendant is not entitled to a reversal or a new 
trial on the ground either that the jury found him 
guilty of the lower degree of homicide, or that the 
court instructed on the lower degree of homicide, as 
to which there was no evidence, the theory being that 
he is not prejudiced thereby and cannot complain." 
In State v. Phinney, 13 Ida. 307, 89 Pac. 634 ( 1907), the 
defendant was charged with murder in the first degree by 
injection of a deadly poison by use of a hypodermic needle. 
The jury returned a conviction for the crime of man-
slaughter. On appeal, it was argued that the trial court had 
erred in instructing on second degree murder and man-
slaughter. The court rejected the contention and stated: 
"Some authorities have been called to our attention 
which at first blush would seem to hold to the contrary 
view; but a careful examination of them satisfies us 
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that upon principle but few, if any, of those cases are 
in conflict with the views above expressed. We are 
satisfied that the purpose and intent of the statutes and 
the reasons for the rule support the view we have here 
taken. We therefor conclude that, although the de-
fendant was charged with the crime of murder per-
petrated by means of poison, and that it was the duty 
of the court to instruct the jury as to the law in such 
cases, and the grade of offense that they might find 
defendant guilty of, still it was within the province 
of the jury to find the degree of the offense, and that, 
even though the evidence might fully disclose that 
the defendant was guilty of a higher degree than that 
found against him, still the verdict could not be dis-
turbed for that reason. It is not an uncommon thing 
for a jury, out of sympathy, or what they conceive to 
be extenuating circumstances, to find a defendant 
guilty of a lower degree or grade of offense than that of 
which the evidence clearly convicts him; but the fact 
that they do so is not a ground of reversal of the verdict 
and judgment. People v. Dunn, 1 Idaho 77; People 
v. Walter, 1 Idaho, 387; State v. Schieler, 4 Idaho, 
120, 37 Pac. 272; State v. Hardy, 4 Idaho, 478, 42 
Pac. 507; State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 612, 64 Pac. 1014, 
97 Am. St. Rep. 252. 
"We find no error that would require or justify a 
reversal of the judgment of conviction in this case." 
In State v. Lindsey, 19 Nev. 47, 5 Pac. 822 ( 1885), the 
Nevada Supreme Court had before it a case where the 
defendant was alleged to have committed the crime of 
murder by administering poison. The jury found the de-
fendant guilty of murder in the second degree. The court, 
in rejecting a contention that the defendant was prejudiced, 
noted that a jury could compromise for whatever reason 
it saw fit and return a verdict of guilty to second degree 
murder. The court stated: 
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"The jury have the undoubted power to fix the 
crime in the second degree when it ought, under the 
law and the facts, to be fixed in the first. 'We need 
not speculate about why it was so provided. It is 
sufficient that it is so written, and we cannot change, 
alter, or depart from it.' Lane v. Com., supra. 
"Our attention has not been called to any case where 
a verdict of murder in the second degree has been set 
aside upon the ground that the testimony was such 
as to make the crime murder in the first degree. But, 
on the other hand, the direct question involved in this 
case has been decided adversely to appellant. State 
v. Dowd, 19 Conn. 387; Lane v. Com., supra. In the 
latter case the court said: 
" 'It has never yet been decided in Pennsylvania that 
a verdict of murder in the second decree [sic J might 
not be given in a case of murder by poison. That it 
may be given is as unquestionable as the power of 
the jury is under the act to give it, and impossible for 
the court to refuse it.' 
"If the jury fix the crime at murder in the second 
degree, in a case where the law and the facts make it 
murder in the first degree, it is an error in favor of the 
prisoner, of which the law will not take any cognizance, 
and of which the prisoner ought not to complain." 
See also State v. Wagner, 78 Missouri 644,4 7 Am. Rep. 131. 
This court need go no further than its own decision in 
State v. Kukis, 65 Utah 362, 237 Pac. 476 ( 1925). The 
appellant there was charged with having committed the 
crime of first degree murder and was convicted of having 
committed murder in the second degree. It was argued on 
appeal that if defendant was guilty of any crime, it would 
be first degree murder. This court observed: 
"A further contention is made that, if the defend-
ant was guilty at all, he was guilty of first degree 
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murder, and hence the court committed error in 
stating and submitting to the jury the elements and 
offenses of second degree murder and of manslaughter, 
the defendant urging there is no evidence to support 
a verdict of second degree murder or of manslaughter. 
We do not see how the defendant can complain of 
that. If on a charge as here there is evidence to show 
murder in the first degree, then of necessity is there 
also evidence to show the lesser and necessarily in-
cluded offenses of second degree murder and of man-
slaughter. First degree murder embraces all the ele-
ments and essentials of second degree, and consists of 
additional elements. We need not pause to point them 
out. The proposition is familiar alike to the bench 
and bar. We thus think it self-evident that, if on a 
charge such as here there is sufficient evidence to show 
the commission of the greater offense, then of necessity 
must there also be sufficient evidence to justify a con-
viction of any necessarily included lesser offense. At 
any rate, the defendant cannot be heard to complain 
because he was not found guilty of murder in the first 
degree instead of second degree, or because the jury 
was given an opportunity to find him guilty of the 
lesser, when they properly could have found him guilty 
of the greater offense." 
Consequently, it is apparent that in the instant case, there 
is no basis to claim error. The evidence was clear to show 
that appellant killed Louis Garcia. By his own admission 
he shot him during the course of a burglary. Consequently, 
there is ample evidence to sustain the conviction of first 
degree murder. It cannot be said as a matter of law that 
the evidence is in any way insufficient. In fact, it is over-
whelming and compelling. Under these circumstances, the 
appellant cannot claim that he was prejudiced because the 
jury saw fit out of caution, mercy, or some other reason to 
find him guilty of murder in the second degree nor can 
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he complain of the court's instruction since even were it 
erroneous, it did not prejudice him. 
It is submitted, however, that the court did not err in 
instructing on second degree murder. The evidence dis-
closed that the appellant had been engaging in conduct 
likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm throughout 
the evening. He had pointed a loaded gun at his com-
panion and pulled the trigger. He had threatened to shoot 
the nozzles off gasoline hoses and had displayed an erratic 
and violent behavior throughout the night. He admitted 
that he disliked Mexicans. The jury could well have found 
from the evidence that the appellant was highly intoxicated 
when he approached the automobile where Louis Garcia 
was sleeping and that because of his previous conduct, he 
shot Garcia without appreciating the full significance of his 
act and not premeditating the killing. This would be suf-
ficient to show murder in the second degree. State v. Rus-
sell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.2d 1003 (1944). Consequently, 
it cannot be said that the record in this case is so devoic of 
evidence as to make the instruction of the trial court on 
second degree murder error. In any event, it was clear that 
it was not prejudicial error. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT'S EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS AD-
MITTING HIS COMPLICITY IN THE CRIME WERE PROP-
ERLY ADMITTED. 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
allowing the jury to consider his oral and written admis-
sions. 
At the outset the respondent submits the factual refer-
ences in the appellant's brief are not an accurate portrayal 
of the record, but reflect a dedicated effort to contort the 
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evidence in a light most favorable to the defense. In review-
ing the trial court's action, this court would be justified in 
finding error only if the evidence, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's decision, demonstrated 
conclusively as a matter of law that the appellant's state-
ments were involuntary. When so appraised, it is apparent 
that the argument of appellant on this point is specious at 
best. 
The record discloses that sheriff's deputies, having a pic-
ture of Richard Engstrom, went to Salty's Bar in Salt Lake 
City to determine if anyone there knew a person named 
Lou who had been with Engstrom on the night of the killing 
(Tr. 117). The bartender indicated that he knew the 
appellant; and on July 9, 1963, sheriff's deputies went to 
Salty's Bar and asked the appellant, who was there, to 
accompany them to a lineup at the Salt Lake City Police 
Station (Tr. 191). They took the appellant to the lineup 
at about 12:45 a.m. on the lOth of July. At that time the 
appellant told the police his name was Clifford Lynn (Tr. 
117). After the lineup he was taken to Davis County for an 
additional lineup at approximately 3:00a.m. He was then 
told that he was under arrest (Tr. 198). The appellant 
was there advised that he was a suspect in a killing, that he 
could have a lawyer, and that he need not say anything but 
if he did, it could be used against him (Tr. 192). After the 
second lineup, he was interrogated by the deputies and 
again advised of his rights (Tr. 193). In addition, the 
appellant was told he could use the telephone (Tr. 193). 
The appellant was not handcuffed nor molested in any 
fashion. During the interrogation, the appellant gave the 
police a false alibi (Tr. 126). Thereafter he was taken back 
into the Davis County Jail and allowed to sleep (Tr. 193). 
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The appellant slept until about 9:00 a.m. on the morning 
of July lOth. 
After awakening, the defendant was taken to the sheriff's 
office where he used the telephone to call Salty's Busy Bee 
Tavern (Tr. 194). After using the telephone, the appellant 
was told that the sheriff's deputies had determined his name 
to be Elmer Lewis Frayer (Tr. 195). The appellant said 
he had been drunk before but that he was now sober and 
would like to give the police a statement of the truth (Tr. 
195). The appellant was again advised of his rights and 
encouraged to obtain a lawyer. Deputy Roxburgh testified 
(Tr. 196) : 
"A. Well, prior, prior to we went through this 
again, we again told him and encouraged him to get 
hold of a lawyer, because of the seriousness of this 
charge. He was still willing to tell us the accountings 
of this particular evening, July 6th, and the early 
morning of July 7th. 
Q. At any time was he denied the use of the tele-
phone? 
A. No. In fact, I think he made several calls that 
morning." 
The appellant again gave the officers an alibi which was 
false (Tr. 545). 
Sheriff Hammon testified in corroboration of the testi-
mony of the deputy sheriff as to the appellant's being fully 
advised of his rights (Tr. 201), and the use of the telephone 
(Tr. 202), which the appellant also admitted. 
In the afternoon of the 1Oth of July, the defendant asked 
if he could see the sheriff (Tr. 203). He stated that he 
wanted to talk to the Sheriff and get the matter off his chest. 
The Sheriff testified (Tr. 203) : 
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"Yes. He told me he wanted to get this thing off 
his chest. He says it had been bothering him, and he 
says, 'I'd like to talk to somebody about it.' He says, 
'I've called my family, and,' he says, 'no one has come 
out, and I'd like to talk to you about it, if you will talk 
to me.' He says, 'I've got to talk to somebody, and tell 
them about it." 
The appellant stated that he would like to give a state-
ment to the Sheriff's secretary (Tr. 204). Exhibit "M" was 
the statement appellant gave. The appellant was again 
advised of his various constitutional rights (Tr. 209). The 
appellant had apparently asked someone to obtain a lawyer 
for him and had talked to his sister (Tr. 206, 207). The 
sheriff told the appellant the truth never hurt anybody and 
that the appellant should tell the truth." (Tr. 211). The 
appellant cried during his statement to the sheriff. The 
questions and answers were taken down verbatim (Tr. 210-
212, Exhibit "M"). 
The opening statement of the appellant's counsel cor-
roborated much of the sheriff's testimony (Tr. 336). 
The appellant's testimony demonstrates the admissions 
made were purely voluntary.3 He testified (Tr. 542): 
"On the way to the Davis County Sheriff's Office, 
these two officers that you were riding with told you 
that you were a suspect in the killing out on the high-
way, and that this was why they were taking you up to 
Davis County; isn't that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. They told you that you had been identified in 
the lineup, didn't they, at Salt Lake City? 
A. Yes, sir." 
* * * 
3 Contrary to appellant's statement in his brief, the statement given in this 
case was an admission not a confession and no predicate for voluntariness was 
required. State v. Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942). 
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"Q. Now, then, along in the afternoon of July 
the lOth, you said that you'd like to tell the Sheriff 
some more about this case; is that right? 
A. I don't recall saying that. 
Q. Well, not in those words. But you requested 
to talk to them some more about it; isn't that right? 
A. Yes, sir.'' 
* * * 
"Well, now, isn't it a fact that Sheriff Hammon, 
when he took your version of what happened on the 
third time that you talked with the authorities, gave 
you every leeway in the world to tell him about it? 
Isn't that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he didn't say- he didn't pressure you, he 
didn't say, 'Well, it was this way,' or put words in your 
mouth, or anything. 
A. No, sir." 
There was no evidence of threats or duress, long inter-
rogation, failure to advise of constitutional rights, or ab-
sence of communication, which make for a coercive atmos-
phere. 
In the instant case appellant was advised of his rights, 
a factor tending to support the finding of voluntariness. 
State v. Ringo, 14 U.2d 49, 377 P.2d 646 ( 1963) ; State v. 
Karumai, supra. Advice to procure counsel was given, and 
communication with relatives and friends was allowed. 
Thus, the circumstances in no way support a finding that 
appellant's admissions should have been excluded as a mat-
ter of law. Indeed, the instruction to the jury requested by 
counsel was not of such a nature as to imply duress or coer-
cion (R. 26). All appellant was told was to speak the 
truth. 
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A mere adjuration to speak the truth will not exclude a 
confession. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 ( 1895). 
In the S parf case, the court obsetved: 
" ... The import of Sodergren's evidence was that 
when Hansen manifested a desire to speak to him on 
the subject of the killing, the latter said he did not 
wish to hear it, but 'to keep it until the right time came 
and then tell the truth.' But this was not offering to 
the prisoner an inducement to make a confession. 
Littledale, J., well obsetved in Rex v. Court, 7 Car. 
& P. 486, that telling a man to be sure to tell the truth 
is not advising him to confess anything of which he 
is really not guilty. See also Queen v. Reeve, L. R. 
1 C. C. 362. Nothing said to Hansen prior to the con-
fession was at all calculated to put him in fear or to 
excite any hope of his escaping punishment by telling 
what he knew or witnessed or did in reference to the 
killing." 
In United States v. Colbert, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 6 C.M.R. 3 
( 1952), the court obsetved: 
"We note, first, that in this record there is no evi-
dence of interminable periods of questioning, no evi-
dence of physical abuse, and no evidence of more 
subtle exertions of compulsion. There is, in short, 
nothing even smacking of 'the third degree.' A mere 
admonition to tell the truth could hardly vitiate a con-
fession it might produce. Sparf and Hansen v. United 
States, 156 US 51, 54-56, 39 Led 343, 15 S Ct 273." 
In Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 367 ( 12 ed.), it is 
observed: 
"Adjurations unaccompanied by a threat or promise 
are not sufficient to render a confession involuntary. 
A mere adjuration to speak the truth does not vitiate 
a confession when neither threats nor promises are 
employed, and the fact that the appeal to speak the 
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truth is made by an officer to a party under arrest 
does not exclude the confession. 
"A normal, innocent person ordinarily would not 
accuse himself falsely on a mere adjuration that it 
would be better to tell the truth, but each case must 
stand upon its special circumstances. The following 
statements, addressed to the accused, were held not to 
render the confession inadmissible as being obtained 
through threats: 'Now remember, if you know the 
parties you had better tell me. I would not suffer for 
anyone else'; 'Tell the truth about the whole matter, 
and keep nothing back'; 'We have got you this time. 
We have traced you around until we are satisfied you 
have got the cow'; 'The more lies told in such cases, 
the deeper one gets in the mud'; 'I am satisfied that 
there are other receivers whom we have not discov-
ered. I should like to have you make a clean breast 
of it'; 'It is no use for you to deny the crime.' Similarly, 
a confession made under the representation of the 
infamy or folly of a concealment, if without threats or 
promises, may be received.'' 
Although the appellant was in custody, he was allowed 
to communicate with his family and friends, allowed to 
sleep and was not subjected to prolonged interrogation. 
Custody itself does not constitute coercion and render a 
confession involuntary. State v. Ringo, supra; Hopt v. 
Utah, 110 U.S. 574; People v. Kirkwood, 5 Utah 124, 13 
Pac. 234; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 366 ( 12 ed.); 
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, § 570 (4th ed.). 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that the 
question to be determined in excluding a confession is 
whether the action of the agents of the government was 
"such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring 
about confessions not freely self-determined .... " Rogers 
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 ( 1961). The circumstances 
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in the instant case show no overbearing action on the part of 
the Davis County Sheriff's Office and none of the activity 
which would warrant exclusion of the confession because 
of misconduct on the part of government officials. See 
Silving, Essays on Criminal Procedure, page 263 ( 1964). 
A case very similar to the instant one is Taylor v. State, 
209 A.2d 595 (Md. 1965), where the court held the con-
fessions were admissible. See also State v. Puchalski, 211 
A.2d 730 (N.J. 1965), and Collins v. Beto, 241 F. Supp. 170 
(D.C. Tex. 1964). 
Although the appellant in the instant case was only 
eighteen years of age, he was not inexperienced. He did not 
immediately respond to the police officers' request for the 
story but gave them two false alibis and even at the time of 
trial had failed to tell the police where he had actually 
thrown the weapon. Although he had only completed the 
ninth grade, he was familiar with things occurring in the 
community and did not appear to suffer from any lack of 
intelligence. On the contrary, he appeared to be more 
mature than other persons his same age. He frequented bars 
and was able to pass himself off as an adult. His previous 
experiences with juvenile authorities made it obvious that 
he v.ras not intimidated by police authority. The facts of 
this case bear no resemblance to those facts in Gallegos v. 
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 ( 1962), where the petitioner was a 
fourteen year old child and was in custody for five days, dur-
ing which time he was interrogated and had no communica-
tion with a lawyer, parent or other friendly adult. The facts 
of the instant case clearly support the finding that the con-
fession was voluntary. Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 
(1958). 
Taking each of the elements that go into determining the 
voluntariness of a confession, it is apparent that the appel-
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lant's confession was voluntary and that the trial court com-
mitted no error in allowing the jury to consider it for what 
weight they would give it. First, there was no prolonged 
questioning; second, there were no threats; third, the ac-
cused was not unfamiliar with police activities and was 
allowed to communicate with friends and was admonished 
to obtain a lawyer during the time he was in custody; fourth, 
there was no coercion except his custody which was of an 
insignificant nature; fifth, no special techniques were used 
to induce the admission; and sixth, the accused was thor-
oughly advised of his rights. It is apparent that appellant 
made his admissions out of remorse and guilt, a very com-
mon occurrence engendered by the Christian ethic. Reik, 
Compulsion to Confess, Chap. II, p. 175 (Grove Press 
1959). 
The appellant contends that the fact that he was not 
taken before a magistrate subsequent to his arrest is of such 
a nature as to warrant the exclusion of his confession. 
The appellant makes an error in his brief when he states 
that the admissibility of a confession is to be determined by 
the same standard as applied in federal prosecutions. The 
case of Malloyv. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), only went to 
the question of whether the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution was applicable against the states by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It did 
not indicate that the same evidentiary standards in the 
receipt of confessions had to be followed by the states. The 
ruleinMalloryv. UnitedStates,354 U.S.449 (1957),and 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), is only a 
rule of evidence applicable in federal courts and is not im-
posed against the states by virtue of the Constitution of the 
United States. State v. Hart, 15 U.2d 395, 393 P.2d 487 
( 1964); State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 579, 230 P.2d 559 
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( 1951) ; State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 
( 1951). Further, the circumstances of this case do not show 
a flagrant disregard of the provisions of Section 77-13-17, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The appellant's arrest was 
late in the evening of the 9th of July or early morning of 
the 1Oth of July. He was interrogated only slightly upon 
arrest and then allowed to sleep. His subsequent interro-
gation and the confession after his request to see the Sheriff 
were not unduly long after his arrest. In any event, the 
delay in taking the appellant before a magistrate would not 
affect his confession. In State v. Hart, supra, this court 
stated: 
"Defendant's contention is without merit. This 
court has previously held that a confession, voluntarily 
given, is not rendered inadmissible because it was 
obtained prior to the time the accused was taken 
before a magistrate. 
"We do not desire to indicate that there was either 
an unreasonable or an unnecessary delay here, but 
even if there had been, that would not render the con-
fession inadmissible in the absence of any indication 
that such delay had some causative effect upon the 
giving of the confession." 
Consequently, it cannot be said that the trial court erred 
in allowing the jury to consider the appellant's admissions 
for whatever weight the jury saw fit to give them. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case was a long and laborious trial. There is 
no evidence that the appellant was in any way prejudiced 
by any action taken at the time of his trial. The reference to 
his juvenile convictions was unobjected to, was a minor 
event in an otherwise long case and was invited by the 
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appellant's injection of his own character into the trial. 
The contention with reference to instructions as to second 
degree murder cannot be sustained since the appellant was 
in no way prejudiced. Finally, the allegation that the con-
fession should have been excluded as a matter of law is 
specious and wholly without substance. 
It is apparent that the appellant committed a serious 
and dastardly crime and the jury properly found him guilty. 
There is no merit in this appeal. The court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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